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1. Introduction 
Countries crafting a sound public procurement system must balance several goals. Of these, 
competition, transparency, non-discrimination, and integrity are probably the most important. 
The economic literature emphasizes the importance of competition for achieving optimal 
allocation of resources. Competition leads to lower prices and higher-quality products for a 
given price. In public procurement, the main issues are preserving free entry and ensuring the 
absence of collusion. Competition can be promoted in procurement markets by prohibiting 
discrimination, adopting transparent procedures, standardizing procedures for awarding 
procurement contracts, opening procurement markets to international trade, and preventing 
collusion among alternative suppliers.  
The concept of transparency in the context of procurement involves five main elements: (i) 
public disclosure of the rules that apply in the procurement process; (ii) publication of 
procurement opportunities; (iii) prior determination and publication of what is to be procured 
and how submissions are to be considered; (iv) visible conduct of procurement according to 
prescribed rules and procedures; and (v) existence of a system to monitor that these rules are 
being followed. The major aim of transparency is to ensure that the rules are followed and that 
non-compliance can be identified and addressed. The effect of transparency is a higher level of 
competition. Since contracting authorities must make procurements publicly known, more 
suppliers can be aware of opportunities. Furthermore, some suppliers will come up with 
proposals that are competitively superior to those of their opponents. This method helps ensure 
that the contracting authority will pick the best possible proposal.  
The principles of equal treatment and transparency are closely related to the principle of 
non-discrimination. Equal treatment requires that comparable situations are not treated 
differently. Thus, a contracting authority must act fairly in the course of public procurement, and 
all competitors must have an equal opportunity to compete for the contract. Finally, we note that 
discrimination against foreign firms in an international trade context includes price preferences, 
outright bans on foreign bidders, local-content-related restrictions such as offsets, and standards 
adopted in the procurement process that raise the costs of foreign firms. If the non-
discrimination principle in public procurement is observed, these practices will be avoided. 
Integrity in procurement involves both the avoidance of corruption and abuse and the 
notion of personnel involved in procurement acting ethically and fairly in avoiding conflicts of 
interest. Corruption practices involve different forms of collusion between government and 
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bidders, such as awarding contracts based on bribes; awarding contacts to firms in which one 
has a personnel interest; awarding contracts to firms in which oneǯs friends, family, or business 
acquaintances have an interest; and awarding contracts to political supporters. Such corruption, 
which can occur in executing as well as in awarding contracts, may prevent the government 
from achieving value for money in their acquisitions. 
The revised World Trade Organization (WTO) Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), 
which came into force on April 6, 2014, stands outside the system of 'Single Undertaking', in that 
it is not binding for all WTO Members, but only for Signatory Parties. The WTO GPA provides the 
Signatory Parties with a framework for ensuring that procurements scheduled under the 
Appendix to the WTO GPA are conducted in a competitive, non-discriminatory, and transparent 
manner, satisfying the conditions on integrity. The WTO GPA allows opening covered 
procurements to international competition. The provisions on contract awards, supplier 
qualifications, and conditions on the procurement process ensure achieving the transparency 
and non-discriminatory conditions of competition between suppliers, resulting in cost savings to 
procuring governments. In addition, access to the WTOǯs dispute settlement mechanism helps 
enforce fair and non-discriminatory competition in public procurement. As a result, the WTO 
GPA is expected to bring about lower prices, better quality, and efficiency gains, and to reduce 
corruption and rent-seeking tendencies.  
In this paper we analyse empirically whether the WTO GPA is effective in promoting non-
discriminant, open, transparent, competitive, and cost-effective government procurement. The 
paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the literature and Section 3 
describes the data set used in the paper. Section 4 analyses the effect of the WTO GPA on 
openness of government procurement markets, and Section 5 investigates whether the WTO 
GPA promotes competition. While Section 6 examines corruption risk, Section 7 analyses the 
effect of WTO GPA on procurement cost-effectiveness. Finally, Section 8 concludes.  
 
2. Literature Overview 
There is a vast literature studying the effects of WTO GPA. In this section we restrict 
ourselves to the discussion of rather recent contributions by Shingal (2011), Rickard and Kono 
(2014), Fronk (2015), Shingal (2015), Kutlina-Dimitrova and Lakatos (2016), and Gourden and 
Messent (2017).  
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Shingal (2011) examines whether the WTO GPA has fulfilled its intended purpose of non-
discrimination. Noting that governments frequently discriminate against foreign suppliers in 
favour of domestic ones, the author studies whether WTO GPA has led to greater market access 
for foreign suppliers. His analysis reveals that the WTO GPA has not been effective in increasing 
or even sustaining market access for foreigners in the services procurement markets of Japan 
and Switzerland.1  
Rickard and Kono (2014) noting that home-biased government procurement is a pervasive 
phenomenon, and that measuring domestic bias is difficult since it is not directly observable, 
measure discrimination in government procurement by estimating the impact of procurement 
spending on the imports of goods and services. According to the authors, an increase in 
procurement shifts spending from the private to the public sector. Regressing the natural 
logarithm of imports (ln(Importsij)) between two country pairs i and j on the natural logarithm 
of contestable government procurement spending by country i (ln(Procurementi)), and 
controlling for other determinants of imports, they obtain the elasticity of imports to 
procurement spending.2 The estimated coefficient should range from zero to negative, with 
larger negative coefficients suggesting higher levels of domestic bias. When the coefficient is 
zero there is no home bias. On the other hand, when the government is more discriminatory 
                                               
1
 In his study of the effects of WTO GPA Shingal (2011) concentrates on public purchases of services for 
Japan and Switzerland derived from annual Japanese and Swiss submissions to the WTOǯs Committee on 
Government Procurement over the period 1997-2003. The author considers 25 service sub-sectors in the 
case of Japan and 26 service sub-sectors in the case of Switzerland. He uses two metrics: (i) the value of 
contracts awarded to foreigners as a proportion of total above threshold contracts; and (ii) the value of 
contracts awarded using a non-limited tendering method as a proportion of total above-threshold 
contracts. Referring to the period 2002-03 as the present time period and to the period 1997-98 as 
previous time period, the author calculates for each service sub-sector the counterfactual values of the 
contracts using the average values of the two metrics for the present and previous time periods and the 
actual values of above threshold contracts during the present time period. His aim is to compare the actual 
outcomes with counterfactuals. The author obtains the value of the counterfactual at the present time 
period by multiplying the value of the metric in the previous time period with the actual value of above-
threshold contract during the present time period. Thereafter, he subtracts from the counterfactual the 
actual value of the contract. In case the value of the metric declines over time, the difference is positive, 
and it is read as the Ǯunrealized foreign market accessǯ in the case of the first metric, and as Ǯunrealized 
internationally competitive biddingǯ in case of the second metric. Calculations reveal that in the case of 
Japan unrealized foreign market access amounts to $1.96 billion and unrealized competitive bidding to 
$21.3 billion. Since the value of above-threshold contracts during the present time period amounted to 
$11.1 billion, and the share of  contracts awarded to foreigners as a proportion of total above-threshold 
contracts during the present time period was 1.1%, the author asserts that foreign service procurement in 
2002-03 would have been more than 15 times higher. Similarly, he finds that the value of contracts open 
to internationally competitive bidding would have been almost three times larger. Thus, according to the 
author there has been significant discrimination against foreign bidders in the government procurement 
services markets in Japan. Similar considerations hold in the case of Switzerland. 
2 Contestable procurement spending means government spending on goods and services less 
compensation of employees and defence expenditures. 
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than the private sector, procurement spending will lower import demand because the 
government buys fewer imports than the private sector. Hence when the estimated coefficient is 
negative there is home bias, indicating government discrimination. Next, the authors ask 
whether the WTO GPA reduces discrimination against foreign suppliers. The authors, using a 
gravity model of trade and making use of annual data for 74 countries over the period 1995 to 
2013, show that the coefficient on procurement spending is negatively signed and statistically 
significant. Their results indicate that the WTO GPA does not significantly reduce discrimination 
in public procurement.  
A different approach has been adopted by Fronk (2015) who is concerned with the 
estimation of the impact of procurement disciplines in bilateral and multilateral agreements, 
which he calls national treatment agreements (NTA). He employs a theoretical model 
incorporating elements from the political economy, international trade, and auction theory to 
derive estimating equations. Then, he empirically analyses the effects of NTAs on procurement 
awards. He concentrates on the case of the US and makes use of data obtained from the US 
Federal Procurement Data System. Using annual observations on federal contracts during the 
period he obtains a rich data set for the period 1996-2010. In the data set he obtains for each 
procurement information on contract value, place of performance, contract year, and nationality 
of the supplier. Since thresholds vary widely among US's NTAs he considers the minimum value 
of these thresholds and concentrates on those procurements above this minimum value.  He 
notes that until 2007 foreign firms were awarded less than 1% of procurement contracts, and 
that only in the final few years of the sample foreign firms began to increase their share. Fronk 
(2015) using a probit selection model finds that signing national treatment agreements with the 
US increases countries' procurement awards, both in terms of contracts and in total value.  
Shingal (2015) using the dataset from the WTO's notifications on domestic and foreign 
purchases by Japanese and Swiss governments at the sector level over the period 1990-2003 
undertakes econometric analysis of the determinants of procurement home bias using variables 
inspired by the political economy, trade-macroeconomic and procurement literatures. The 
empirical results reveal that the coefficient on the WTO GPA is statistically insignificant 
indicating that the disciplining mechanisms of the WTO GPA may not have led to greater foreign 
access to the governments' goods procurement market.3  
                                               
3
 When conducting the econometric analysis of home bias in government procurement Shingal (2015) 
concentrates on public purchases of goods and services for Japan and Switzerland derived largely from 
annual Japanese and Swiss submissions to the WTOǯs Committee on Government Procurement over the 
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Recently Kutlina-Dimitrova and Lakatos (2016) have analysed the impact of a set of selected 
explanatory variables on the probability of awarding public procurement contracts directly 
cross-border using a multivariate logit model. The explanatory variables include contract value, 
number of offers, GDP per capita, trade-to-GDP ratio, scope of public enterprises, regulatory 
protection of incumbents, barriers to FDI, and type of tender procedure. The authors have 
obtained procurement related data from Tenders Electronic Daily (TED) based on contract 
award notices in EU Member States for the 2008-2012 period. After removing from the dataset 
extreme values and large number of reporting errors due to non-compliance, the authors end up 
with approximately 1.2 million observations.  Empirical results reveal that the value of a 
contract has a positive influence on the probability of cross border win, implying that high-value 
contracts are more likely to be awarded to a foreign company. In addition, the results point to a 
negative influence of the number of offers on the probability of a cross-border win.4     
Finally, Gourdon and Messent (2017) making use of TED data for the period 2009-2014 
study the impact of a set of selected explanatory variables on the probability of awarding public 
procurement contracts directly cross-border. The explanatory variables include GDP, import, 
distance, government procurement share in GDP, common border, common language, colony 
and remoteness.  In addition, the authors include dummies if the reporting and partner 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
 
 
 
period 1990-2003. Since these data have been collected regularly after 1995, the database for analysis 
during 1990-1995 has been assembled manually. The author considers 26 goods sub-sectors in the cases 
of Japan and Switzerland, 24 services sub-sectors in the case of Japan, and 26 services sub-sectors in the 
case of Switzerland. As the dependent variable he uses the share of foreign in above threshold 
procurement by value. He regresses the dependent variable on WTO GPA dummy which takes the value of 
one 1996 onwards and zero otherwise. As control variables he uses the average product of labour, the 
share of exports in output, the number of export destinations, annual rate of GDP growth, annual 
percentage changes in real effective exchange rate, dummy variables for election years, and dummy 
variables for the year preceding the election. Empirical analysis reveals that the coefficient of WTO GPA 
dummy is statistically insignificant when both goods and services data are taken into consideration. He 
concludes that the disciplining mechanism of the GPA may not have led to greater foreign access to 
government procurement markets.   
4 In the empirical analysis when the authors consider the odds ratio defined as the probability of cross 
border procurement divided by the probability of  domestic procurement,  the results reveal that the odds 
of awarding a contract cross-border grow by 1.6 % as the value of a contract increases by € 1 million; and 
that the odds of awarding to a foreign contractor decrease by 26.7 % with the log of number of offers. In 
addition, the results indicate that GDP per capita of the awarding country impacts the probability of a 
cross-border award positively; that  trade-to-GDP ratio of the awarding country  impacts the probability of 
a cross-border award positively; that of all types of awarding authorities, it is local governments that have 
the lowest propensity to award contracts to cross-border providers; and that  utility providers have the 
highest propensity to award contracts to cross-border providers. 
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countries are both in the WTO GPA or have signed an agreement with procurement disciplines 
to assess the efficiency of such agreements. The authors show that a country's membership of 
the WTO GPA increases the probability of their firms being awarded a procurement contract in 
the EU through the cross-border mode of supply. While under WTO GPA membership foreign 
suppliers may win a greater share of available contracts, the authors show that the procurement 
pie is not expanding. Noting that procurement will be discriminatory if foreign firms cannot 
contest the procurement market through foreign direct investment or if government entities 
differentiate among firms based on their nationality, the authors investigate also the role of 
investment agreements. Using Rickard and Kono’s basic (2014) framework, the authors show 
that FDI barriers reduce the effectiveness of the WTO GPA in increasing the chance of a cross-
border award, and that to maximize gains from WTO GPA accession, a country should also 
undertake investment liberalization.5  
To emphasize the added value of the present paper compared to existing literature we note 
that the paper uses TED micro-level data released recently by the EU, covering more than three 
million tenders conducted in the European Economic Area (EEA), Switzerland, and Macedonia 
over the period 2006 to 2016.6  A very interesting feature of this data set is the variable B_GPA, 
which records whether the contract is covered by the WTO GPA.  Using this data set, we examine 
the following research questions: 
 
 Does the WTO GPA foster openness of government procurement markets by 
increasing the probability that a foreign firm will win a contract? 
                                               
5
 Gourdon and Messent (2017) when analyzing the impact of international agreements on the elasticity of 
import of goods to procurement spending use a bilateral gravity model of imports. The data used in the 
analysis consists of annual bilateral import data from UN Comtrade covering the period 1995-2013. The 
sample comprises 74 countries. 44 of these countries have bilateral agreements with procurement 
disciplines with at least one other country in the sample, 32 countries have investment agreements, and 
35 countries are GPA signatories. In the regression equation while the dependent variable is the value of 
import between country i  and j,  explanatory variables include besides the WTO GPA dummy variables 
such as size, GDP, tariffs, distance, common border, common language, colony and remoteness. To 
investigate the role of investment agreements the authors add to the regression equation variables 
representing joint procurement and investment agreement and joint GPA membership and investment 
disciplines. Empirical analysis reveals that GPA reduces home bias in general and even more when 
signatory countries have international investment disciplines. 
6 The data set is open to the public and can be downloaded at 
https://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data/dataset/ted-csv. Note that while Kutlina-Dimitrova and Lakatos (2016) in 
their analysis use TED micro-level data covering the period 2008-2012 and Gourdon and Messent (2017) 
use TED micro-level data covering the period 2009-2014 we use extended TED data covering the period 
2006 to 2016.  
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 Does the WTO GPA promote competition by increasing the number of offers 
submitted? 
 Does the WTO GPA lower corruption risk in government procurement?  
 Does the WTO GPA improve procurement cost-effectiveness by lowering the 
probability that procurement price is higher than the estimated cost of the 
procuring authority? 
 
The TED contains detailed information on public procurement contracts that allow us to 
examine the above research questions. Our empirical analysis provides the following results: 
First, we show that the WTO GPA reduces barriers for foreign countries to win government 
procurement contracts by analysing the winning probability of a foreign firm using a 
multivariate logit model. Second, we find that the WTO GPA promotes competition. Third, we 
find that corruption risks, measured in two different ways (below), are lower in WTO GPA 
auctions: 
 
 The first measure is the probability of being a single-bid auction. 
 
 The second measure is the number of recurrent wins by a single firm. 
 
Finally, we show that the WTO GPA improves procurement cost-effectiveness by lowering 
the probability of procurement price being larger than the estimated cost.  
 
3. Main Features of the TED Data Set 
The TED data set contains data about 3,562,829 government procurement contracts 
conducted in 33 countries during the years 2006-2016. As stated in TED (2016), the source of 
the data is contracting authorities and entities across Europe. The data is extracted from the 
contract notice and contract award notice standard forms filled by the authorities.7 Public 
authorities are obliged to publish their tender invitations on TED for all contracts exceeding EU 
public procurement thresholds. However, as emphasized by Kulina-Dimitrova and Lakatos 
(2016) contract awards below the threshold are also reported on TED since authorities are in 
general not prevented from announcing the tender on TED even if the tenderǯs value is below 
                                               
7
 The standard forms of the EU are available at "http://simap.ted.europa.eu/web/simap/standard-forms-
for-public-procurement 
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the threshold, and since tenders are often awarded to the most economically advantageous 
bidder, i.e. even though the initial contract value is above or at the threshold, the final award 
value might be well below the threshold.  
To conduct the empirical analysis, we employ the TED award notices data. 1,936,456 of 
these contracts are covered by the WTO GPA and 1,626,373 are non-WTO GPA contracts 
indicating that 46% of the procurements in the TED dataset are non-WTO GPA contracts. Note 
that the coverage schedules are a critical part of the WTO GPA.8  The EU ǮSIMAPǯ9 form for public 
procurement contains question IV.1.8 that asks whether the procurement is covered by the WTO 
GPA.  In the empirical part of the paper we use this information to examine the effects of WTO 
GPA on government procurement. Table 1 displays the distribution of the contracts across 
countries, and we present average contract values for each country in the Online Appendix.10 We 
note that firms from 201 different countries have won at least one contract.11,12   Finally, note that 
while Armenia, Canada, EU member countries, Hong Kong, Israel, Republic of Korea, New 
Zealand, Chinese Taipei, and the US are parties to the WTO GPA, some of the important trade 
partners of the EU such as Australia, Egypt, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Russian 
Federation, Thailand, and Turkey are not.13   
 
{Insert Table 1} 
 
                                               
8 Article II of WTO GPA describes the scope and coverage of the agreement. For more details see the Online 
Appendix.   
9 Acronym for information system for public procurement (fr. système d'information pour les marchés 
publics). 
10 Procurements conducted in France and Poland constitute a significant percent of the data set, 23% and 
27% respectively. The TED documentation states that ǲGenerally, the data consists of tenders above the 
procurement thresholds. However, publishing below threshold tenders in TED is considered good 
practice, and thus a non-negligible number of below threshold tenders is present as well.ǳ Compared to 
other countries, French and Polish authorities regularly report contracts below the threshold value. We 
conduct the empirical analysis by using the complete data set with all countries and by using a narrower 
data set excluding France and Poland.  When we examine all countries, we use separate dummy variables 
for France and Poland to control for the asymmetric representation of these countries. Empirical results 
are similar with and without these dummy variables.   
11 Tables OA.3 and OA.14 in the Online Appendix display the distribution of winner countries. 
12 We manually processed the countries with unlikely number of winner firms. For example, Afghanistan 
has 203 contracts. Although the total amount of exports from Afghanistan to the EU is 417 million Euros 
for the 2006-2005-time period, it might be excessive that 203 firms from Afghanistan win an EU public 
procurement contract. The TED data set also contain the names and addresses of the firms. We matched 
the names and corrected winner country information. These modifications do not change the results since 
they make up 0.0001 % of the data set. 
13 We present the number of successful firms in EU tenders from selected countries in the Online 
Appendix. 
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Each contract in the data set is identified by a unique contract ID number. The year of the 
contract, contracting authority name, contracting authority country, CPV sector code, winner 
firm name and winner firm country are available for each contract.14 We use this information to 
examine the likelihood of a foreign firm to win a contract and to construct the network structure 
of firms in each country. We identify the sector of procurement using the first two digits of the 
CPV code noting that there are 72 major sectors.15 
Government institutions implement different procurement procedures. The most common 
procedure is Ǯopen tenderǯ with 1,405,288 GPA covered and 1,234,645 non-GPA contracts 
awarded using the open procedure. Additionally, authorities implement negotiation, restricted 
auction and competitive dialogue procedures.16 TED data set also provides information about 
procurement results, namely procurement price, estimated cost determined by the procuring 
authority and number of offers received.  
Figure 1 displays market concentration statistics. We identify firms by their names and 
base-countries. One of the unique features of the TED data set is the availability of firm names 
and the countries they are located. We use that information to calculate total number of wins by 
a single firm. There are 414,917 unique firms that have won at least one contract. 90% of the 
firms have won 10 or fewer contracts. When we consider only the WTO GPA covered 
procurements we note that 258,647 unique firms have won on average 7.48 contracts. In 
comparison, when we consider non-WTO GPA contracts the average number of wins is 8.38 by 
193,981 firms. Figure 1 displays the histogram of total number of wins showing that more than 
50% of the firms win only one contract.  
 
{Insert Figure 1} 
 
4. Effect of the WTO GPA on the Openness of Government Procurement Markets 
To analyse the effects of the WTO GPA on openness of government procurement markets 
we consider three cases. First, calling a firm foreign whenever the country of the procuring 
authority is different from the country of the firm we examine whether the WTO GPA eliminates 
                                               
14
 One of the irregularities that we observe is about total number of wins by each firm. 20 firms out of 
414,917 have won more than 10,000 contracts in the TED data set. These firms operate in multiple 
sectors. 
15 Detailed summary statistics for each sector are provided in the Online Appendix. 
16 We provide detailed information about procedure types in the Online Appendix.  
 11 
 
 
 
 
barriers for foreign firms to win government procurement contracts. Next, we consider a 
different definition of foreign firm, and define a firm foreign whenever the procuring authority is 
in an EU Member State and the country of the firm is a non-EU State. We then examine whether 
the WTO GPA promotes non-EU firms.17 Finally, the third case investigates whether the WTO 
GPA encourages competitive tendering procedures. 
 
4.1 Effect of WTO GPA on the Probability that a Foreign Firm Will Win a Contract 
In this sub-section, we examine whether the WTO GPA eliminate barriers for foreign firms 
to win government procurement contracts by estimating the following logit regression 
specification: 
 
        (1) 
 
where  is a dummy variable, that is, 1 if procurement is awarded to a foreign firm18  when the 
authority and winner countries are different.  is a logit probability function of  
and  contains the explanatory variables ,  and .  is the dummy variable, 
which is 1 if the procurement is covered by the WTO GPA. The coefficient of  provides us 
the impact of the WTO GPA on the probability that a foreign firm wins a government 
procurement contract in EU countries.19  contains dummy variables for procurement method 
(type), and dummy variables for type of contracting authority.  are country-specific factors 
such as trade-to-GDP ratio and GDP per capita. We obtain these variables from the World 
Development Indicator database of the World Bank. Finally,  contains fixed-effects dummy 
variables for the years 2007 to 2016 and sector dummy variables, identified by the first two 
                                               
17
 EU directives regulate intra-EU procurement but if the EU does not have an FTA with procurement 
market access commitments with a country that is a party to the GPA - US, Japan, Armenia - then the 
access to EU markets by these firms under GPA schedules will likely affect intra-EU procurement due to more bids 
= competitive pressures etc. 
18 We follow Kutlina-Dimitrova and Lakatos (2016) when identifying foreign firms. We call a firm foreign 
if the country of the procuring authority is different from the country of the firm. For 2813 contracts, there 
is no information on the winnerǯs name or country, and for 37,512 contracts, information is missing on the 
CPV code. We do not examine these contracts and remove them from the data set.  
19 We also estimate alternative regression specifications with additional control variables: country-
specific factors such as trade-to-GDP ratio and GDP per capita and procurement-specific variables such as 
number of offers, contract value. We display the estimation results in the online appendix. 
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digits of the CPV codes.20 Note that foreign firms have been awarded 61,889 contracts: 37,516 
covered by the WTO GPA and 24,373 non-GPA contracts.21  
Table 2 conducts multivariate logit regression and instrumental variable (IV) GMM linear 
probability model estimation to examine the effect of WTO GPA on the probability that a foreign 
firm wins a contract. The first three columns of Table 2 examine the data set excluding France 
and Poland, 1,793,764 contracts. As presented in Table 1, 44% of GPA covered and 54.79% of 
non-GPA contracts are conducted in France and Poland. Over representation of these countries 
might alter the results. Accordingly, we conduct the empirical analysis using the complete data 
set and excluding France and Poland to assess the robustness of the results.  In the second 
column, we focus on the contracts with estimated contract values above the thresholds 
determined by the EU, namely 1,413,379 contracts. Specifically, we eliminate contracts where 
the estimated contract values are not known and the contracts below EU threshold levels.  
The third column considers that the WTO GPA covered variable might be endogenous. 
There might be unobserved factors that authorities use to determine whether tenders are 
covered by the WTO GPA. These unobserved factors might also be related with the probability 
that a foreign (or non-EU firm) wins a contract. In that case, the WTO GPA covered variable will 
be correlated with the error term and this endogeneity problem will affect the results. We 
employ an instrumental variable GMM methodology to consider possible endogeneity of GPA 
covered variable. Lewbel (2018) shows that a linear probability model can be estimated using 
heteroscedasticity based instrumental variables (IV) of Lewbel (2012) when the dependent 
variable is binary and explanatory variable is potentially endogenous. Accordingly, we correct 
for possible endogeneity of the WTO GPA covered variable by implementing the IV generalized 
method of moments (GMM) methodology of Lewbel (2012) to the linear probability model in 
equation (2).22  
                                               
20 Additionally, we use a dummy variable for France and Poland in our empirical analysis to control for the 
asymmetric representation of these countries. 
21 We display the total number of wins by foreign firms for each country in the Online Appendix Tables 
OA.3 and OA.14. 
22
 Lewbel (2012) constructs valid instrumental variables that are independent of the error term using the 
heteroskedasticity structure of the error term. Previously, Rigobon and Sack (2003) use a similar 
identification technique to assess the reaction of monetary policy to the stock market. Lewbel (2012) 
generalizes this identification technique. Accordingly, it can be applied to data sets with different 
structures like the TED data set.  The method developed by Lewbel (2012) identifies structural 
parameters by constructing instruments as functions of the modelǯs data when valid instrumental 
variables do not exist. This approach provides an unbiased and consistent estimate of parameters when 
the regression model contains endogenous or mismeasured regressors, or when the model suffers from 
the omitted-variable bias. The Monte Carlo results and numerous empirical applications presented in 
Lewbel (2012) show that the estimator works very well compared to the two-stage least squares method 
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        (2) 
 
where  is a dummy variable as described in equation 1. β1 in equation 2 measures the effect 
of WTO GPA on the probability that a foreign firm wins a contract. X’ contains the control 
variables as described above. 
 
{Insert Table 2} 
 
In Table 2 columns 4-6 investigate all countries, 3,524,060 contracts. Column 5 focuses on the 
contracts with estimated contract values above the EU thresholds. Finally, column 6 implements 
the IV-GMM methodology to all contracts.23  
The coefficient of the WTO GPA-covered variable is significant, with a positive sign for all 
regression specifications. Accordingly, we conclude that foreign firms are more likely to win 
government procurement contracts when the contract is covered by the WTO GPA. This result 
indicates that the WTO GPA is successful in lowering the barriers for foreign firms to win 
government procurement contracts in EU Member and affiliated countries.  
4.2 Effect of the WTO GPA on the Probability that a non-EU Firm Will Win a Contract 
In this sub-section, we consider a different definition of Ǯforeign firmǯ and examine whether 
the WTO GPA promotes non-EU firms.  We note that during years 2006-2016 13,591 non-EU 
firms had won 29,045 government procurement contracts in the EU. We conduct multivariate 
logit regression and IV-GMM linear probability model estimation to examine the effect of the 
WTO GPA on the probability that a non-EU firm wins a contract. We estimate the following logit 
regression specification and linear probability model: 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
 
 
 
and to GMM when good instrumental variables are not available. The methodology uses the 
heteroskedasticity of the errors to construct valid IVs and consistent and unbiased parameters of the 
empirical model can be estimated by employing these IVs in and IV-GMM setting.  
 
23
 We also estimate different regression specifications with different sets of explanatory variables to assess the 
robustness of our results. These results are available in Table OA.5 in the Online Appendix.  
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                                     (3) 
            (4) 
 
where  is a dummy variable that is 1 if procurement is awarded to a non-EU foreign firm. 
 is a logit probability function of .  and Xǯ contains the explanatory variables 
described above. The coefficient of  provides us the impact of the WTO GPA on the 
probability that a non-EU firm wins a government procurement contract in the EU Member and 
affiliated countries.24  
{Insert Table 3} 
 
Table 3 above displays the results of the multivariate logit regression estimation of equation 
3 and IV-GMM linear probability model estimation using Lewbel (2018) methodology as in 
equation 4. Like Table 2, the second and fifth columns focus on contracts with estimated contract 
values above the EU thresholds. The coefficient of the WTO GPA covered variable is significant 
with a positive sign for all regression specifications. Accordingly, we conclude that non-EU firms 
are more likely to win government procurement contracts when the contract is covered by the 
WTO GPA. The WTO GPA opens the EU government procurement market to non-EU firms.  
 
4.3 Effect of the WTO GPA on Procurement Method: Multinomial Logit Regression Analysis 
 
The WTO GPA encourages competitive tendering procedures. Procurements must be 
carried out in a transparent and impartial manner avoiding conflict of interest and preventing 
corrupt practices using methods such as open tendering, where any supplier may respond to a 
published call for tenders, or selective tendering, where bids are restricted to prequalified 
suppliers who have demonstrated that they meet technical competence norms. Limited 
tendering, under which potential suppliers are directly solicited to bid by the procuring entity, is 
non-competitive and may be used in only following circumstances: situations in which no 
tenders were submitted; no tenders that conform to the essential requirements of the tender 
documentation were submitted; no suppliers satisfied the conditions for participation; or the 
tenders submitted have been collusive. In this section, we investigate the effect of the WTO GPA 
                                               
24
 We also estimate alternative regression specifications with additional control variables: country-
specific factors such as trade-to-GDP ratio and GDP per capita and procurement-specific variables such as 
number of offers, contract value. We display the estimation results in table OA.5 in the online appendix. 
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on methods of procurement. We study whether the WTO GPA promotes openness by affecting 
the choice of the procurement authorities on procurement types.  
We implement a multinomial logit regression analysis. We determine Ǯaward without prior 
publication of a contract noticeǯ and Ǯnegotiated without a call for competitionǯ as the base 
outcomes. Accordingly, we investigate the effect of the WTO GPA on the probability of 
competitive and open procedures compared to procedures without competition.25 We find that 
the WTO GPA significantly increases the probability that authorities implement open and 
competitive procedures like open (first-price auction) procedure, competitive dialog and 
restricted first-price auctions. The coefficients of WTO GPA dummy variables for competitive 
dialog, open and restricted open procedures are significant and positive. 
 
5. Effect of the WTO GPA on Competitive Environment 
In this section, we examine whether the WTO GPA improves the competitive environment 
by increasing the number of offers submitted for a contract. We implement a negative-binomial 
regression methodology, as suggested by Bajari and Hortacsu (2003), to assess the determinants 
of the number of bidders. Specifically, we examine the following regression equation: 
 
       (5) 
 
where  is the number of bids submitted for each contract.26 We exclude France and Poland 
and examine contracts from remaining EU countries. We present the empirical results with all 
countries in Table OA.7 of the Online Appendix.27 The second column of Table 4 examines 
tenders with estimated contract values above EU thresholds consisting of 1,283,658 contracts. 
The coefficient of the WTO GPA-covered variable is significant, with a positive sign for all 
regression specifications. This result indicates that significantly more firms submit offers to 
WTO GPA-covered procurements. Hence, we conclude that the WTO GPA improves the level of 
competition in government procurement auctions.  
                                               
25 We display multinomial logit regression results in Table OA.6 in the Online Appendix.  
26 Of the contracts we examine, 4919 had no information about the number of offers, so we do not include 
them in our calculations.  
27 We also estimate alternative regression specifications with additional control variables: country-
specific factors such as trade-to-GDP ratio and GDP per capita and contract value. We display the 
estimation results in table OA.7 in the Online Appendix. 
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{Insert Table 4} 
 
6. Corruption Risk in Government Procurement and the WTO GPA  
Cost-effective government procurement requires a competitive and transparent 
procurement system. Corruption limits competition and artificially increases procurement 
prices above a competitive level. Therefore, to be able to improve procurement cost-
effectiveness, authorities should conduct appropriate competition policy actions to deter 
collusion in public procurement. Hence, collusion prevention is one of the goals of the WTO GPA. 
In this section, we investigate whether the WTO GPA manages to limit collusion.  
We first construct collusion measures to gauge collusive risk in government procurement in 
the EU. Fazekas et al. (2014) calculate a proxy indicator of corruption by using signs of limited 
competition such as a single bid received and the same company winning recurrent contracts. 
Ishii (2009) provides details about the operational structure of bidding rings that manipulate 
public procurement auctions. Bidding rings determine the winning firm by considering the 
previous intentional losses of a bid member. Accordingly, ring members that do not win a 
contract for a certain period of time are more likely to win the next rigged auction. This indicates 
that bidding ring members tend to win higher number of contracts compared to non-ring 
members. We employ the arguments stated by Ishii (2009) and use the total number of contracts 
by a firm as a potential indicator of collusion. We examine the impact of the WTO GPA on 
corruption by assessing how the WTO GPA affects two red flags of limited competition: contracts 
with a single bid and a firmǯs win ratio. 
 
6.1 Contracts with Single Bids 
Of all procurements in the time period we study, 762,813 (21%) contracts were conducted 
when there was only one offer. Of this total 21%, namely 285,905 contracts were WTO GPA 
covered and 476,908 were not. We estimate a multivariate logit regression, where the response 
variable is the dummy variable, that is, 1 when there was only one offer in a contract. We 
estimate the following regression specification: 
  
  (6) 
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where  is the single-offer procurement dummy variable and equals 1 if procurement was 
conducted with only one offer.   contains the explanatory variables , ,  and  
as described above in Section 4.  
Last two columns of Table 4 display the regression results using all contracts and using 
contracts with estimated values above EU thresholds.28 The table shows that the probability of a 
one-offer procurement is significantly lower for WTO GPA-covered procurements. The 
coefficient of the WTO GPA-covered dummy variable is negative and significant at the 1% 
significance level. In other words, it is more likely that WTO GPA-covered procurements attract 
more than one offer. Accordingly, we conclude that the WTO GPA helps governments promote a 
competitive procurement environment that is less susceptible to collusive behavior. Table OA.8 
in the Online Appendix estimates equation 6 using complete data set with all EU countries and 
employs additional control variables. The WTO GPA covered variable is significant with a 
negative coefficient in OA.8. The magnitude of the coefficient is lower (-0.16 compared to -0.27 
in Table 4) when we examine all EU countries.  
6.2 Firms’ Winning Ratios 
The second measure that Fazekas et al. (2014) use to gauge corruption risk is the number of 
recurrent wins by a single firm. To evaluate recurrent wins, we calculate the percentage of a 
firmǯs total number of wins in a specific sector and country. For example, if the percentage value 
of a firm is 50, then that firm has won half of the contracts in a sector and country. Therefore, a 
higher percentage value indicates that fewer firms manage to win contracts and the corruption 
risk is higher.  
We present the summary statistics of the total number of wins by each firm in Table OA.9 in 
the Online Appendix. The maximum value is 100 percent, and the table shows that in some 
countries all contracts are won by a single firm in a sector. WTO GPA-covered procurements are 
won by firms with a slightly lower average number of total wins: 0.65 compared to 0.67. The 
difference between WTO GPA-covered and non-covered procurements is statistically significant, 
with a p-value of 0.002.  
                                               
28
 We also estimate alternative regression specifications with additional control variables: country-specific 
factors such as trade-to-GDP ratio and GDP per capita and contract value. We display the estimation results in 
the online appendix. 
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The above considerations reveal that corruption risks, measured first by the probability of 
being a single-bid auction and second by the probability of recurrent wins by a single firm, are 
lower in WTO GPA auctions. 
 
7. Does the WTO GPA Improve Procurement Cost-Effectiveness?  
Finally, we examine the impact of the WTO GPA on the cost-effectiveness of government 
procurement. We measure cost-effectiveness using the ratio of procurement price to estimated 
value. We can use only 1,116,249 observations for this analysis since the estimated value is 
missing for a substantial number of contracts. Additionally, we have eliminated the outliers by 
implementing Billor et al.ǯs (2000) BACON methodology (blocked adaptive computationally 
efficient outlier nominators) to identify the outliers.29 Although both the contract price and the 
estimated cost should have been entered in Euros, some observations have been entered in local 
currencies. Additionally, the contract price may be for one unit; however, the estimated cost may 
represent the total amount, which causes the ratio to be unrealistically small.30 We identify these 
entries as outliers and eliminate them.31 We display the ratioǯs summary statistics in the Online 
Appendix Table OA.11. On average, the ratio is equal to 0.89, indicating that the contract price is 
89% of the estimated cost. Some contracts are very inefficient, in that they are significantly 
higher than the estimated cost.32  
We follow the description of OECD (2012) to identify inefficient procurements. As stated by 
OECD (2012) ǲvalue for moneyǳ can be assessed by comparing the procurement price and 
estimated costs. Specifically, procurement prices that are higher than the engineering cost 
                                               
29
 Table OA.11 in the Online Appendix present the summary statistics with and without outliers. The ratio 
of procurement price and estimated cost has very unrealistic values like 2.5e+15 compared to 1.87 when 
we eliminate outliers. Table OA.10 presents the regression results with outliers. The extreme values most 
likely caused by error produces significantly biased results with unrealistic coefficients.  
30
 For example, the procurement price might be entered as 10,000 Euros for one car, but the estimated cost might 
be 1,000,000 Euros for a fleet of 100 cars. Therefore, ratio of 10,000/1,000,000 will be unrealistically small.  
31 We removed 145,465 observations that were identified as outliers by the BACON methodology.  
32
 As stated by Conley and Decarolis (2016, 6) the estimated cost ǲis the maximum (the public authority) is 
willing to pay.ǳ Conley and Decarolis (2016) analyze auctions held between 2000 and 2010 by Italian 
public administrations to procure contracts for simple roadworks in Northern Italy. They find that on 
average the contract price (winning bid) is 13.4 percent lower than the estimated cost. Similarly, Ishii 
(2009) shows that the ratio of winning bid to estimated cost is between 0.95-0.8 in Okinawa Prefecture 
road construction auctions in Japan. Onur et al. (2012) find similar results for Turkish public procurement 
auctions. Winning firms provide significant discounts compared to the estimated cost. Inefficient 
procurement has significantly higher ratios compared to the average ratio of 0.89 in TED procurement. 
We display this statistic in Table OA.11 in the online Appendix. Minimum ratio is 0.25 and maximum is 
1.87 for EU public procurement in the TED data set. 
 19 
 
 
 
 
estimates are not cost-effective. OECD (2012) suggests that public authorities should investigate 
these procurements. We identify the tenders with procurement prices larger than estimated 
costs (ratio of price and estimate is larger than one). We determine 225,837 (17.45%) 
procurements that are not cost-effective since their procurement prices are larger than their 
estimated costs.  
We conduct several regression analyses to investigate whether WTO GPA lowers the 
probability that a tender is inefficient (ratio of price and estimate is larger than one). We also 
examine the impact of collusive behaviour on procurement efficiency by analysing the effects of 
single-offer procurements. Specifically, we estimate the following regression specifications: 
 
                                    (7) 
           (8) 
where  is a dummy variable that is 1 if the procurement price is larger than 
the estimated cost.  is a logit probability function of .  and Xǯ contains the 
explanatory variables described in Section 4. 
We consider the endogeneity of the number of bidders and of the GPA dummy variable 
when conducting the regression analysis.33 As stated by Estache and Iimi (2010) and Onur et al. 
(2012), the existence of factors that might simultaneously influence biddersǯ participation 
decisions and the winning bid might cause the OLS estimates to be inconsistent. Ohashi (2009) 
argues that unobserved attributes of the procurement process are represented in the error term, 
and that biddersǯ participation decisions are likely to be correlated with these unobserved 
procurement attributes. Accordingly, potential correlation between the error term and number 
of bidders might cause an endogeneity problem. Additionally, authorities might determine WTO 
GPA covered tenders based on these unobserved attributes represented in the error term. 
Therefore, both number of bidders and the WTO GPA dummy variables might be endogenous.  
Table 5 below displays the results of the multivariate logit regression estimation of 
equation 7 and IV-GMM linear probability model estimation using Lewbel (2018) methodology 
as in equation 8. 
                                               
33 One might argue that the exclusion process might cause an endogeneity problem. Accordingly, we treat 
both the number of bidders and the GPA variables as potentially endogenous when conducting the 
regression analysis. An alternative regression specification, where we treat the GPA dummy variable as 
exogenous, rendered similar results. Table OA.12 in the Online Appendix display the Ordinary Least 
Squares results.  
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Columns 1-4 in Table 5 display the estimation results excluding France and Poland. 
Columns 5-8 analyse all EU countries. All regression specifications in Table 5 show that the WTO 
GPA-covered dummy variable is significant with a negative coefficient. The WTO GPA lowers the 
probability that procurement price is larger than estimated cost. Accordingly, WTO GPA covered 
tenders are significantly more likely to be cost-effective.  
 
{Insert Table 5} 
 
In addition to the impact of the WTO GPA on procurement efficiency, Table 5 provides 
consequential results about the effect of competition and potential corruption. We find that 
competition plays a consequential role for improving procurement efficiency. The coefficient of 
the number of offers is negative and significant in all regression specifications. An increase in the 
number of bidders significantly lowers the probability that procurement price is higher than 
estimated cost. The second, fourth, sixth and eighth columns of Table 5 examine the impact of 
potential corruption on procurement efficiency. We consider the proxy for potential corruption, 
namely single-bidder procurement as described in section 6.1. We conclude that corruption 
significantly lowers government procurement efficiency. The single-bidder dummy variable has 
a significant positive coefficient. Hence, single-bidder contracts have significantly higher 
probabilities that procurement price is larger than estimated cost. These results display the 
importance of competition as well as the importance of eliminating corruption in achieving 
government procurement efficiency.  
 
8. Conclusion  
This paper uses a unique data set provided by the EU, covering more than three million 
tenders conducted in the EEA, Switzerland, and Macedonia between 2006 and 2016. It analyses 
empirically whether the WTO GPA is effective in promoting non-discriminant, open, transparent, 
competitive, and efficient government procurements. The main results of the paper are 
summarized below: 
 The WTO GPA significantly increases the probability that a foreign firm will win a 
government procurement contract in EU Member and affiliated states.  
 The WTO GPA promotes a competitive environment by increasing the number of 
offers.  
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 The WTO GPA significantly lowers corruption risk by decreasing the number of 
contracts with a single offer, and by decreasing firmǯs winning ratios. 
 The WTO GPA promotes cost-effective public procurement. 
 The level of competition in the procurement environment is a significant 
determinant of government procurement efficiency. An increase in the number of 
offers decreases the contract price with respect to the estimated cost.  
 Single-offer procurements have significantly lower efficiency; the procurement price 
for these contracts is higher compared to procurements conducted with multiple 
offers.  
The empirical results displayed above have many policy implications. Non-WTO GPA 
countries could use the results to convince their constituents to accede to the WTO GPA. 
Empirical analysis presented in the paper show that WTO-GPA promotes competition and 
probability that foreign firms win procurement contracts. Higher levels of competition 
significantly lower procurement prices. Finally, the paper shows that public authorities should 
closely monitor single-bid procurements since these contracts have significantly higher 
procurement costs.  
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